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 Should someone with more adult children expect to have further chances of 
avoiding institutionalisation in old age than someone with fewer children? Should an 
aging population build more institutions for the elderly, including for the elderly with 
children? 
We show that population aging – as the motive for the reduction of the number 
of children to every parent – does not imply that the elderly with adult children will 
have to rely more on institutions when they need long-term care.  
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The aging of the developed world brings with it several problems. One of them 
is the need of assistance an increasingly larger part of the population - the elderly - 
experiments. When living alone, many elderly feel unsafe, feel too lonely, and/or are 
physically incapable of taking care of themselves. They need long-term care. 
 
Additionally, this increasingly larger part of the population tends to have fewer 
children per capita than previous generations. This means that the accommodation of a 
lonely old parent is becoming more important to each surviving child. 
Although we cannot establish an immediate link between the type of living 
arrangement and the level of well-being, it is clear that living arrangements widely 
influence the daily lives of the elderly and their life satisfaction. 
Reasons may be pointed to justify that coresidence improves the old person’s 
well-being: there are increasing returns in sharing a house, for instance, in domestic 
services (cleaning, laundry, meals), in the rent payment, in consumption (electricity, 
telephone, cable TV). Help with personal care, entertainment and companionship may 
also be more easily available when the elderly share a household than when they live 
alone.
2
 There may be less opportunity for loneliness feelings – although that depends on 
the amount of contacts that the old person has during the day and the number of 
contacts he
3
 would have if not living with children. 
                                                 
2 Burch and Matthews (1987) (referred in Wolf (1994)) and also Palloni (2000)  note that each household 
living situation is like a composite good that includes physical shelter, domestic services, personal care, 
privacy, power/authority, independence, recreation, companionship and consumption of economies of 
scale. 
 
3 For simplicity, when referring to someone that could be either feminine or masculine, I will use the 
masculine form, although it could be exactly the other way round. 
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 In spite of the motives that justify the increase in the well-being of the elderly 
originated by coresidence, there are also potential negative effects. Loss of 
independence, loss of authority, negative personal relations or difficulty in adapting to 
the living style of the new coresidents may prove damaging to the elderly’s well-being. 
 These positive and negative effects are obtained by comparison with the 
independent living alternative. Nevertheless, when the elderly are not capable of living 
alone, the comparison should be made between the alternatives of coresidence with kins 
and institutionalization
4
. The referred negative aspects of coresidence also apply to 
institutonalization. Additionally, the environment is more impersonal and sometimes 
less affective.  
 Several characteristics of the elderly and of their children have been pointed out 
in the literature, that help explain the living arrangement decisions. 
The health status, including the number of functional disabilities is one of the 
main determinants of the living arrangement, especially of the probability of living 
alone. This is testified by Crimmins and Ingegneri (1990); Norton (2000) finds that 
health is the primary determinant of demand for nursing home care; Mutchler and Burr 
(1991) (cited by Schneider and Wolf (1997)) find health to be significant when the 
choice of institutionalization is considered, although insignificant when this choice is 
not included in the possible living arrangements. Boersch-Supan et al. (1992) find that 
functional ability is the primary determinant of living arrangement choices. 
Empirical studies, - like Kotlikoff and Morris (1990) and Boersch-Supan, et al. 
(1988) - have related the level of income of the elderly, and of the children, with the 
probability of living in separate houses. They point to a positive influence of the income 
level on the probability of the old person living alone. Possible explanations are the 
preference for “intimacy at a distance” with the affordability of formal home care, that 
allows the parent to age in place, or the higher opportunity cost of restricting the supply 
of working hours for the children with higher income levels. A negative relation could 
be justified by the competition for the parent’s money: the larger the parent’s income or 
wealth, the greater the interest of children in having the parent at home. 
 Another factor that is often considered as a determinant of living arrangements is 
the number of children.  
                                                 
4 We could consider instead two possible alternatives in a more general way: one relying on informal care 
(which includes coresidence with kins), and the other relying on formal care (which includes 
institutionalization).  The model that we develop in the rest of this paper would still be valid, as long as 
the scale of the elderly’s preferences were adapted accordingly. 
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The empirical literature is not unanimous about this subject. Several studies in 
the literature identify a negative and significant effect of the number of children on the 
odds of living alone relative to living with others. [Burr and Mutchler (1992); Crimmins 
and Ingegneri (1990), and Spitze and Logan (1990)]  However, Wolf (1994) refers that 
Aquilino (1990) finds that the number of children are not significant in explaining 
parent-child coresidence. In this study the likelihood of coresidence is evaluated given 
that there is at least one unmarried child. Some other studies that analyse the probability 
of transitions from one living arrangement to another find that the effect of the number 
of children is not significant when other factors such as health, income and 
demographic characteristics are controlled. [Worobey and Angel (1990), Speare et al. 
(1991), and in part Spitze et al. (1992)]. Wolf and Soldo (1988) conclude that the 
composition of the kin network is more important in explaining the choice of living 
arrangements than its size.  
Hoerger et al. (1996) find that having more children irrespectively of distance of 
residence has no impact on the probability of institutionalization. However, having no 
children increases the likelihood of nursing home entry. This is exactly in line with the 
results we obtain in our paper. 
Theoretically, this relation between the number of children and the likelihood of 
each living arrangement is not entirely clear, and has not been explored. Wolf (1994) 
mentions that the number of available kin represents a constraint on the set of living 
arrangements. Engers and Stern (2002)
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 write that the number of children “determines 
the number of options in the choice set and it interacts with other explanatory 
variables”. Also, in Hiedemann and Stern (1999), the estimated model points to an 
increase in the chance that a parent receives care from a child or lives in an institution 
with a larger number of children. The other alternative would be to live independently. 
We agree that the number of available kin represents a constraint on the set of 
living arrangements. The larger the number of children, the larger the number of 
possible living arrangements. In the limit, an elder with no available kins, who is 
incapable of living alone, has institutionalization/ formal care as the single possible 
solution. 
                                                 
5 Engers and Stern (2002) present one of a few very interesting theoretical models that incorporates 
strategic behaviour and consider the role of n children when modelling the decision about the living 
arrangements. Hiedemann and Stern (1999), Checkovich and Stern (2002), and Byrne et al. (2004) are 
others. Although they obtain relevant results when they estimate the models, their main purpose is not to 
examine the rationale for the effect of the number of children on the living arrangements of an elderly 
parent. 
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In this paper we argue that the aging of the population implies a larger demand 
of formal care for the frail elderly, to the extent that it is accompanied by a larger 
incidence of childlessness.
6
  If the dominant rule was to have the elderly live with 
children, it should not matter much whether there were many or few children. One 
should be enough to guarantee the coresidence outcome, even if the costs of caregiving 
were concentrated in one household.
7
  
We show that a parent with many children has no further chance of escaping 
from living all the time in an institution, when costs of effort and financial costs of 
caring for a parent are considered.  
Then, we introduce a disappointment effect that expresses the emotional impact 
on the parent of having a child that does not offer the parent’s preferred living 
arrangement. This effect is finally found to be a channel through which the number of 
children negatively affects the probability of full time institutionalization.  
We, therefore, conclude that population aging does not necessarily imply a need 
for more institutions for elderly with adult children – when living with children is a 
cultural possibility and it is preferred by the parent. 
Our paper extends the preceding literature on long-term care decisions/ living 
arrangements of the elderly by developing a theoretical model of family decision 
making – when there has been a predominance of the empirical perspective -  trying to 
rationalize the possible relation between the number of children and the living 
arrangements of the elderly, which had not formally been done.  
 It challenges a widespread idea - although not always supported by the 
empirical analyses - that a smaller number of children should unequivocally imply 





1. Hypotheses of the model 
 
 The following hypotheses are assumed. 
                                                 
6 Palloni (2000, p.38) has been alone in his acknowledgement that “declines in fertility could exert 
immediate pressure on coresidence only if accompanied by widespread childlessness.” 
7 Won and Lee (1999) for instance, refer that in Korean society elderly parents live predominantly with 
the only or eldest son, when there is one. Accordingly, they find that the number of children is not related 
to the choice of living arrangements. 
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H1. The parent has no conditions to live alone, either for health reasons or for 
psychological reasons. 
 
H2. The parent has enough income or wealth to cover his consumption, he does 
not need financial help from his adult children. 
 
H3. The parent gets along equally with all his adult children and respective 
families. 
 
H4. The ranking of the parent’s preferences with respect to his accommodation 
in old age is the following: 
1st: to live with one of his children, 
2
nd
: to live equal periods of time with each of his children, 
3
rd
: to live in an institution. 
 
H5. The parent’s utility of living in an institution is negative. 
 
H6. Adult children prefer to live with the narrow family: living with an old 
parent represents a cost of time and effort. However, children are altruistic with respect 






2.  The model with two children 
 
2.1. Description  
 
 The adult children are the players of the game. We start by considering the 
existence of two adult children in a symmetric game.  
N = {1, 2} children. 
                                                 
8 Although we state H6 in the above terms, we could change the interpretation of costs of effort, including 
possible benefits in them, and allowing for negative values. 
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Ai = {V1, V1/2, VIns}, N∈∀i  
A = × N∈i Ai 
ui : A → R 
ui (Vi ,V-i)= utility of child i when child i plays Vi iA∈ , and the other child plays 
V-i. 
 The payoffs are represented in Table 1. 
 
(insert Table 1)  
 
 When both adult children offer to have their parent live with them full time, the 
parent will accept the offer of any of the children with equal probability because he is 
indifferent between living with one or the other. Therefore, the payoff of each child will 
be the utility to their parent of always living with the same child (his first option) - 
U(V1) - less the cost of living with the parent all the time multiplied by the probability 
of being the child that gets the parent. 
When one child offers to have his parent live with him all the time and the other 
offers one of the other possibilities, the parent will live with the child that made the 
offer for permanent accommodation. Therefore, when one of the adult children offers to 
have his parent with him permanently, all the payoffs will have the utility to their parent 
of always living with the same child. The difference will lay in the costs. Only the child 
who gets the parent has positive costs. The other has zero costs, whichever offer he 
makes.  
When both adult children offer to have their parent half the time, they will have 
their parent’s utility of getting his second option - U(V1/2) - but each will have half the 
costs compared to the full time coresidence solution.  
When one of the adult children offers to have his parent half the time but the 
other decides to have him in an institution, several alternatives can be assumed: 
a) institutional care is not constrained by the supply side, so the parent will live 
half the time with one child and in an institution the other half; 
b) it is difficult to find institutions, it is not feasible to get in and out for 
periods, therefore the parent has to stay in the institution all the time; 
c) it is difficult to find institutions, it is not feasible to get in and out for 
periods, therefore the child who refuses to have the parent in an institution 
during his half of the time, has to take care of the parent all the time. 
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We assume alternative a). 
In this case, only the child who has the parent with him half the time has costs, 
and these are half the costs compared to the full time coresidence solution. 
When both adult children decide to have their parent in an institution, they do 
not have costs, but they have negative utilities reflecting their parent’s negative utility. 
We are going to solve this simultaneous game taking into consideration the Nash 
equilibria in pure strategies only. 
 
 
2.2. Results  
 
We provide the solutions to the model of section 2.1. in Appendix 1. 
What can we say about the determinants of each living arrangement? 
What determines which living arrangement is settled is the real improvement in 
the well-being of the parent from passing from an outcome to the next preferred 
outcome and the comparison of this improvement with the increase in costs imposed on 
the children. It is possible to have full time coresidence as the equilibrium solution 
despite U(V1) < C(V1). The reason is the negativity of U(VIns). What really matters to the 
decision is not the level of the utility it reaches but the increase in utility that it allows. 
Even at a great cost of time and effort, the child may decide to have his parent 
with him all the time, if he observes that it is really very, very important for the parent 
to be with just one of the children. It may be the case that the children live very far apart 
and the parent has problems with travelling or that he has fragile things in his dear 
possessions that he hates to change from place to place, for instance. It is also decisive 
that the aversion the parent has with respect to living in an institution is considerable. 
 A larger )()( 2/11 VV UU − - that is, a larger A 
9
 - diminishes the probability of the 
parent going to an institution and also the probability of the parent spending part of the 
time with each child. With larger )()( 2/11 VV UU − , larger costs are necessary in order for 
the parent to go to an institution. Furthermore, it is necessary that )()( 2/11 VV UU −  is 
small for the outcome of going from one house to the other to be possible.  
                                                 
9 A is defined as )()( 2/11 VV UU − . 
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A larger )()( Ins2/1 VV UU − - that is, a larger B 
10
 - increases the probability of the 
parent not going to an institution. It increases the probability of the parent going from 
house to house and also the probability of staying all the time with the same child.  
When it is possible that the parent goes from house to house, it is also possible 
that he stays with just one child, with the other child wanting to send him to an 
institution. It is not compatible with the parent staying with just one child, with the other 
child offering to have the parent half the time. Figure 1 illustrates the possibilities of 
each solution in relation to the level of costs and in relation to the structure of the 
preferences of the parent. We introduced the simplifying condition A + B =1 that does 
not change the intuition and allows the graphic representation.  
 
(Insert Figure 1) 
 
Larger costs of having the parent at home start by increasing the probability of 
the shared outcome, – if )()( 2/1 InsVV UU − is sufficiently large- and then increase the 
probability of the institution outcome.  
C(V1) > U(V1) - U(VIns) is the condition for the parent to live in an institution.  
Multiple coresidence is empirically one of the less prevalent living 
arrangements. Checkovich and Stern (2002) assert that no papers modelled shared 
caregiving among children, probably because that situation is not common in the data. 
That is consistent with our model, since multiple coresidence only exists as a multiple 




3.  The extension to n children 
 
3.1. Description  
 
We have now  
N = {1, 2, …, n} children, 
Ai = {V1, V1/n, VIns}, N∈∀i . 
                                                 
10 B is defined as )()( Ins2/1 VV UU − . 
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The extension to n players of a game in a discrete form, whose payoffs are not 
well represented by continuous, well behaved functions, is not a completely trivial 
exercise. To facilitate the reasoning, we introduce ui (Vi, d, e) = utility of child i when 
child  i plays Vi iA∈ , there are d children apart from i that do not play V1 and there are 
e children apart from i that play V1/n. It is now possible to generalize the payoff 
functions in the following way: 
ui(V1, d, e) = U(V1) – C(V1)/(n-d) ,       0 ≤ d,e ≤ n-1    (1) 
 




































   (2) 
 
 
























     (3) 
 
 
If d = n-1,  
and ai (element of Ai) = V1,  then ui = U(V1) – C(V1);    (4) 
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3.2. Results: The effect of the number of children 
 
We provide the solutions to the model of section 3.1. in Appendix 2. 
 Generally, if costs are large, the parent goes to an institution, if costs are not so 
large, he can be all the time with one child or divide his time among children. It is only 
possible that he divides his time among children when the improvement in the parent’s 
utility for not going to an institution is larger than the loss for not staying with only one 
child, and the children’s costs are between the two values. 
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 The main purpose of extending the model to n children is to allow us to 
investigate the effect of the number of children on the living arrangements. So, what can 
we say about the probability of each living arrangement as the number of children 
grows? For instance, is the probability of staying all the time in an institution different 
for a parent with many children than for a parent with few children? Of course, if the 
parent has any children the probability of being taken care by children rises dramatically 
compared to the same probability for a parent with no children. But that is a special 
case. Does that probability continue to rise as the number of children grows? 
 In our model, as long as C(V1) > BA+ , full time institutionalization is a unique 
equilibrium, and that condition is not affected by the number of children. 
When C(V1) BA+≤ , the full time coresidence outcome is a solution. The other 
outcomes apart from the full time institutionalization are never unique equilibria. When 
the conditions for their existence are verified, the full time coresidence outcome is also 
a possible equilibrium. The number of children changes the zones where multiple 
equilibria exist.  
The number of children has an indeterminate effect on the likelihood of dividing 
time equally among the children.  A larger n has two effects on the likelihood of 
dividing time equally among all children. The first effect is related to the fact that 
dn
nnd ))1/(( −
<0, which conveys an enlargement of the probability of dividing time equally 
among all children. The second effect is a result of the fact that )( /1 nVU decreases with n. 
In this situation, a larger n enlarges A and decreases B by the same amount. Through 
this channel, the probability of dividing time equally among children is smaller with a 
larger n. The global effect is, therefore, indeterminate. 
The likelihood of dividing time between his children and an institution, which 
was already small because the corresponding condition is very restrictive, is even 
smaller for a parent with more children. 
As we see, it is not at all obvious that an old person with more children should 
with more ease avoid an undesired institution outcome and reach the favourite full time 
coresidence arrangement. 
Naturally, this model is very basic. One may argue that the large financial costs 
usually associated with institutions that provide long-term care to the elderly may 




4.  The model with financial costs  
 
The financial costs are important to the choice of the living arrangement and 
they have not yet been included in the model. The cost of having the parent in an 
institution was null because we assumed that the income or wealth of the parent was 
enough to pay for the institution. It was also enough to pay what the adult children spent 
with the parent, should the parent stay with them. Let us change this setup. 
It is now important to the adult children what is spent with the parent. It may be 
because the income/wealth of the parent is not enough to pay for all the expenses, so 
that the children must pay for part of it, or because the children administrate their 
parent’s income/wealth and receive what is saved, or simply because they expect a 
bequest that will be smaller, the more it is spent by the parent now. 
This financial cost may be introduced through a second cost component that is 
larger when the parent is in an institution and is smaller when the parent lives with his 
children. Hypothesis H2. in the original model substitutes for  
H2’.: The cost of the living arrangement is important to the decision of the 
children. The most expensive solution is the ‘institutionalization’.  
Table 1’ is an adaptation of Table 1 to this modified setup. It shows the payoffs 
of the model with financial costs and two children. 
b is the ratio of the financial cost of keeping the parent at home over the 
financial cost of having the parent in an institution. 
b <1, reflecting the idea that the financial costs of living with the parent are 
inferior to the financial costs of having the parent in an institution. 
 
(insert Table 1’)  
 
 
5.  The extension of the model with financial costs to n children 
 
The payoff functions are now 




(VIns) ,       0 ≤ d,e ≤ n-1   (7) 
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In the Appendix 3, we present the conditions required for every type of solution 
to this model with financial costs.  
As before, it is not an equilibrium to have more than one sibling offering to have 
the parent with them all the time. Also as before, when it is an equilibrium to have a full 
time coresidence outcome, it is not an equilibrium to have a full time institutionalization 
outcome. Which outcome is preferred when financial costs are considered, depends on 
the sign of (1/n –b). If b>1/n, the probability that the conditions for the full time 
coresidence solution are verified decreases and it is not clear what happens to the 
probability of the full time institutionalization outcome. If b<1/n, it is the effect on the 
first probability that is indeterminate and the probability of the full time 
institutionalization outcome that clearly decreases. In an extreme case, with null 
financial costs of having the parent at home, and positive financial costs of 
institutionalization, the financial cost effect unequivocally favours the full time 
coresidence outcome. 
The two outcomes whose probability undoubtedly rises are the division of time 




6.  The effect of the number of children in the model with financial 
costs 
 
Together with the effects that were present in the model without financial costs, 
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there are now more effects as the number of children grows.  
A large n reduces the attractiveness of V1/n in comparison to VIns, since U(V1/n) 
becomes closer to U(VIns). If b>1/n, the inclusion of financial costs makes VIns more 
interesting when compared to V1. And the larger the n, the easier it is that such 
condition is verified. Therefore, the larger the number of children, the larger the 
probability of the verification of the conditions for a full time institutionalization 
outcome when financial costs are introduced. 
A large n has conflicting or indefinite effects on the chances of verification of 
the conditions for the other outcomes. The effect of the inclusion of financial costs is 
influenced by the number of children only as V1 becomes less interesting when 
compared to VIns. This acts against the full time coresidence outcome and in favour of 
the division of time between children and an institution. Nevertheless, as it is not clear 
whether a larger n makes V1 more or less attractive than V1/n, it is not possible to state 




7.  The model with financial costs and a disappointment effect 
 
In the previous sections, we have considered that the living arrangement is what 
really matters to the parent. Nevertheless, we may consider that not only the decision 
but also the process that leads to the decision is relevant to the parent. As the parent 
prefers living with his children, and with the same all the time if possible, and as the 
parent knows his children know his preferences, there can be some disappointment in 
realizing that none of the children offers to have him at home. We could also see this 





We assume that for every child that wants to have him at home only part of the 
time, there is a reduction in the parent’s utility of α1. For every child that wants to have 
him in an institution, there is a reduction in the parent’s utility of α2. α1 and α2 are, thus, 
a kind of disappointment coefficients, and, obviously, α1 < α2. 
 Considering this new disappointment effect, the payoffs become the following: 
                                                 
11 This expression was appropriately suggested by a discussant of the paper. 
12  A contentment coefficient expressed as an increase in the parent’s utility for getting an offer of a living 
arrangement that pleases him more than institutionalization, instead of a disappointment coefficient for 
getting offers that are not the most desired ones, would have identical results. 
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(VIns) - α1.e - α2.(d - e),       0 ≤ d,e ≤ n-1    (10) 
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One could argue that in our model each child’s utility function expresses the 
same valuation of the parent’s disappointment with him and of the parent’s 
disappointment with a sibling, and that it should not be so. Child i should be more upset 
by the parent’s disappointment with himself. Nevertheless, if we introduce that 
distinction, nothing is changed in the results. That is because all equilibrium conditions 
end out a result of comparisons that differ only in what child i does in different 
circumstances. Child i may change, but it is always a first person evaluation.   
In the Appendix 4, we present the conditions required for every type of solution 
to this model with costs of effort, financial costs and a disappointment effect. 
This version of the model displays some new features. It is now possible that 
there are equilibria including more than one V1. On the other hand, when V1 is played, 
no one plays VIns. 
VIns and V1/n are seldom played simultaneously. 
A large A acts in favour of a full time coresidence outcome, and against the part 
time coresidence, part time institutionalization, and full time institutionalization  
outcomes. A large B acts only against the outcomes that include institutionalization. 
The disappointment effect favours the full time coresidence outcome in relation 
to the part time coresidence. A large coefficient α1 acts in favour of the full time 
institution outcome, whereas a large coefficient α2 acts against it. As α1 < α2, the 




8.  The effect of the number of children in the model with financial 
costs and a disappointment effect 
 
A large number of children reinforces the negative impact of the disappointment 
effect on the chances of a full time institutionalization outcome. It weakens the positive 
impact on the chances of full time coresidence with all but one sibling offering to have 
the parent at home part of the time. At the same time, it reinforces the positive impact 
on the chances of full time coresidence with everyone playing V1. 
These results show a kind of herd behaviour: when all the siblings play V1/n, a 
large number of siblings decreases the attractiveness of playing V1; on the contrary, 
when all the others play V1, a large number of siblings increases the attractiveness of 
playing V1. 
A large number of children may enlarge the probability of part time coresidence 
and shorten the probability of institutionalization if the disappointment coefficient 
corresponding to every child that proposed to have the parent in an institution is really 
large compared to the other disappointment coefficient. It cannot be firmly stated that 
the probability of part time coresidence grows with the number of children because of 
the loss of attractiveness of the part time coresidence solution when the number of 
children grows (B decreases). Nevertheless, the disappointment effect is the only 
channel through which the number of children negatively affects the conditions for 
verification of full time institutionalization. 
 A larger n unequivocally enlarges the chances of part time institutionalization. 
Nevertheless, they remain small. 
  
 
10. Conclusions  
 
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model that intends to describe, in a 
simple way, what may motivate the decision of long-term care for an elderly, frail 
parent. In particular, we address the issue of how the number of children influences such 
decision. 
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The three possible living arrangements that are considered are coresidence with 
only one of his children, division of time equally among children and 
institutionalization. The preferences of the parent are known. 
The adult children would rather not have to take care of the old parent, for it 
represents a cost of effort and time, not easily compatible with busy, modern life. 
However, they care for their parent and take into account their parent’s utility when they 
decide. 
It is found that the living arrangement obtained is a result of the comparison of 
the cost of taking care of the parent and the improvement in the parent’s utility of 
adopting the next preferred arrangement. It is the improvement in utility that counts and 
not really the level of utility.  
We add two extensions to the just described model (the canonical model): an 
extension to financial costs – where institutionalization is assumed to be the most 
expensive living arrangement, and an extension to an effect of disappointment felt by 
the parent with every children’s undesired proposal of living arrangement. 
The solutions reflect strategic interaction among adult children. In the canonical 
model, if one of the siblings offers to take care of the parent all the time, no other 
sibling will do the same. It is easier that one of the adult children stays with the parent 
all the time when the other siblings want to have the parent in an institution, than when 
there are other children who offer to take care of the parent part of the time.  
Nevertheless, it is easier for one child to offer to take care of the parent part of 
the time when the others do the same than when some others want to have the parent in 
an institution. This is because the temptation to offer full time coresidence is larger in 
the last situation. This is so much so that it is not an equilibrium to be the only sibling to 
offer to have the parent part of the time with the parent living in an institution the rest of 
the time. 
In the canonical model, although multiple equilibria are possible, the full time 
coresidence and the full time institutionalization outcomes are mutually exclusive.  
Although sometimes economists regard multiple equilibria as an annoyance, it in 
fact expresses a component of arbitrariness of life. Some authors consider that realistic 
games possibly admit multiple equilibria for at least some combinations of parameters, 
and that exploiting the presence of multiplicity conveys more information than 
imposing simplifying assumptions [Andrews et al. (2004), Myerson (2003), Tamer 
(2003)]. 
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 When financial costs are introduced, the likelihood of the equally divided 
arrangement and the likelihood of the division of time between children and an 
institution increase. The likelihood of the full time institutionalization decreases if the 
financial cost of having the parent in an institution is larger than that of having him at 
home even part of the time. The likelihood of the full time coresidence arrangement 
decreases as long as the saving from having the parent at home instead of in an 
institution is inferior to the saving from paying for the parent part of time instead of all 
of the time.  
With the extension to a disappointment effect, it is no longer impossible that 
more than one child offers full time coresidence.  
The disappointment effect undoubtedly makes full time institutionalization more 
difficult, and full time coresidence more appealing compared to the other possible living 
arrangements. 
Table 2 summarises the results concerning the impact of each considered effect 
– cost of effort, financial cost, and disappointment effect – on each possible outcome. 
In the canonical model, the number of children does not change the condition for 
full time institutionalization, and the effect of the number of children on the 
probabilities of full time coresidence and of division among all children is 
indeterminate. Concerning financial costs, a large number of children acts in favour of 
the full time institutionalization as compared to the full time coresidence arrangement. 
A larger number of children strengthens the negative influence of the disappointment 
effect on the chances of the full time institutionalization arrangement. A larger number 
of children may enlarge the probability of part time coresidence and shorten the 
likelihood of institutionalization, if the disappointment coefficient corresponding to 
every child that proposed to have the parent in an institution is really large compared to 
the other disappointment coefficient.  
The model including the disappointment effect allows for the possibility of 
having a positive association between the number of adult children and the probability 
of the parent living with children instead of in an institution. It must be noted, though, 
that that result is just one possibility and is not at all guaranteed.  
As we see, a parent with many children that would rather live with the same 
child all the time, is not safely closer to his aim than a parent with few children. A 
parent with many children is closer to avoiding institutionalization only if the 
disappointment effect surpasses the cost effects. 
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Therefore, population aging – as the motive for the reduction of the number of 
children to every parent – does not imply that the unmarried elderly with adult children 
will have to rely more on institutions when they need long-term care.  
Naturally, population aging also involves more childless elderly, and our model 
does not consider those. 
Further empirical and theoretical work is needed on this problematic. 
Empirically, the positive relation between the number of children and the probability of 
institutionalization should be checked with several different data bases, obtained in 
different countries. Theoretically, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to a 
model that considers the increased chances of having more than one elderly parent to be 
cared after – a parent and a parent-in-law -, as a result of population aging. A possible 
competition for coresidence with children should be more severe in an aging world, 
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The solutions of the canonical model, with 2 children 
 
We managed to write the necessary conditions for each solution in a simple way 
with interesting properties: it allows for a graph representation, it facilitates 
comparisons among different solutions and it is helpful in detecting what underlies the 
decisions. In order to have that, we put in evidence three elements in every condition: 
C(V1), the difference between U(V1) and U(V1/2) – which will be called A - and the 
difference between U(V1/2) and U(VIns) – which will be called B. 
 
(V1, V1) cannot be a Nash equilibrium: if a sibling offers to have the parent all 
the time, the other’s best response is not to offer the same. It is indifferent if this one 
offers V1/2 or VIns, since the consequences will be equal: he will have no costs and the 
parent will be entirely satisfied all the same. 
For (V1, V1/2) and  (V1/2, V1) to be  equilibria, it must be that: 


















            (A1) 
 
b) There is no better answer to V1 than to play V1/2. This is always true. Playing 
V1/2 delivers the largest payoff, which is equal to the payoff obtained by playing VIns. 
 
For (V1, VIns) and  (VIns, V1) to be equilibria, it must be that: 



















           (A2) 
 
b) VIns is the best answer to V1. This is always true. Playing VIns delivers the 
largest payoff, which is equal to the payoff obtained by playing V1/2. 
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For (V1/2, V1/2) to be an equilibrium, it must be that there is no incentive to 


















            (A3) 
 
For (VIns, VIns) to be an equilibrium, it must be that there is no incentive to 


















            (A4) 
 
Systems (3) and (4) are incompatible. For all the conditions to be verified, A 
would have to be non-positive, which would go against H4. Therefore, (V1/2, V1/2) and 
(VIns, VIns) cannot both be equilibria at the same time. 
  
(VIns, V1/2) and (V1/2, VIns) are not equilibria. For V1/2 to be the best answer to 
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            (A6) 
For systems (5) and (6) to be compatible, it should happen that C(V1)= B. 
However, together with the first condition of system (5), this would imply that A < 0, 










The solutions of the canonical model, with n children 
 
 In this section, A accounts for )(V)(V 1/n1 UU −  and B accounts for 
)(V)(V Ins1/n UU − . 
In equilibrium there is not more than one V1. With someone else playing V1 
(d<n-1), ui(V1/n, d, e) = ui(VIns, d, e) = )( 1VU > ui(V1, d, e) = U(V1) – C(V1)/(n-d),  
always. Therefore, it is not optimal to play V1 when someone else is already doing so. 
  
There are three types of possible solutions that include someone playing V1:  
1.1) (V1, V1/n, …, V1/n). In this case, d = n-1, and e = d, with Vi = V1; 
1.2) (V1, V1/n, …, VIns). In this case, d = n-1, and 0<e<d, with Vi = V1; 
1.3) (V1, VIns, …, VIns). In this case, d = n-1, and e = 0, with Vi = V1. 
 
There are three types of possible solutions where no sibling plays V1 and where  
at least one plays V1/n:  
2.1) (V1/n, V1/n, …, V1/n). In this case, d = n-1, e = d, and Vi = V1/n; 
2.2) (V1/n, V1/n, …, VIns). In this case, d = n-1, 0<e<d, and Vi = V1/n; 
2.3) (V1/n, VIns, …, VIns). In this case, d = n-1, e = 0, and Vi = V1/n. 
 
There are three types of possible solutions where no sibling plays V1 and where 
at least one plays VIns:  
3.1) (VIns, V1/n, …, V1/n). In this case, d = n-1, e = d, and Vi = VIns; 
3.2) (VIns, V1/n, …, VIns). In this case, d = n-1, 0<e<d, and Vi = VIns ; 
3.3) (VIns, VIns, …, VIns). In this case, d = n-1, e = 0, and Vi = VIns. 
 
In order to have a type 1.1) equilibrium,  






























          (A7) 
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 b) it must also not pay to deviate from playing V1/n when someone else plays V1 
and the others play V1/n (d=e<n-1). This always happens. 
 
In order to have a type 1.2) equilibrium, 
a) it must not pay to deviate from playing V1 when the others play either V1/n or 































        (A8) 
 
b) It must also be optimal not to deviate from playing V1/n when someone else 























       (A9)  
and they are always verified. 
 
c) Additionally, it must not pay to deviate from playing VIns when there is 
























This system, equal to the previous one, is always verified. 
Therefore, in order to have a type 1.2) equilibrium, the only requirement is 
system (A2). 
 
In order to have a type 1.3) equilibrium, 
a) it must not pay to deviate from playing V1 when everyone else plays VIns. This 


















         (A10) 
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 b) It must also not pay to deviate from playing VIns when someone else plays V1 






















        (A11) 
 
which always happens. 
In order to have a type 2.1) equilibrium, it must not pay to deviate from playing 




















        (A12) 
 
In order to have a type 2.2) equilibrium, 
a)  it must not pay to deviate from playing V1/n when no one else plays V1. This 




















       (A13) 
 
b) Additionally, it must not pay to deviate from playing VIns when no one else 




















        (A14) 
The combination of systems (13) and (14) lead to ABVC
e
n≥=)( 1 . 
 
In order to have a type 2.3) equilibrium,  
a) it must not pay to deviate from playing V1/n when everyone else plays VIns. 




















            (A15) 
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b) Additionally, it must not pay to deviate from VIns when no one is playing V1. 
d=n-1. This is the same system as (14). 
 
We can see that the two conditions in system (15) are not compatible. Therefore, 
(V1/n, VIns, …, VIns) is not a possible equilibrium. 
 
In order to have a type 3.1) equilibrium,  
a) it must not pay to deviate from playing VIns when the others play V1/n. This 




















        (A16) 
 
b) Additionally, it must not pay to deviate from playing V1/n when no sibling 
plays V1. That is, system (13) must be satisfied. 
 


















         (A17) 
 
In order to have a type 3.2) equilibrium,  





















       (A18) 
 
b) Additionally, it must not pay to deviate from playing V1/n when no sibling 
plays V1. This is system (13) again. 


















         (A19) 
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In order to have a type 3.3) equilibrium, it must not pay to deviate from playing 




















        (A20) 
 
Summing up the results we may say that: 





















  and 0 ≤e ≤d.    (A21) 
 
The system reduces to only one of the conditions. However, what condition is 
active depends on the relation between (A-e.B)/(n-1) and –e.B/n. If A>e.B/n, the active 
condition is BneBAVC )./()( 1 −+≤ . If A<e.B/n, the active condition is 
)1/().()( 1 −−++≤ nBeABAVC . Both conditions are larger, the smaller e is. This means 
that the largest active condition is the one with e=0. In this case, the two conditions 
convert to BAVC +≤)( 1  and )1/()( 1 −++≤ nABAVC , respectively. The largest active 
condition is, therefore, BAVC +≤)( 1 . That is, for all U(VIns), U(V1/n) and U(V1), as long 
as C(V1) is smaller than ( ))()())()(( Ins/1/11 VVVV nn UUUU −+− ,  V1 is an equilibrium. 
 








1 .        (A22) 
c) The parent stays in an institution all the time when: 
BAVC +≥)( 1 .         (A23) 











The solutions of the model with costs of effort, financial costs, and n children 
 
Considering the taxonomy of solutions that was presented in Appendix 2, a type 































































      (A25) 
 
b) it must also not pay to deviate from playing V1/n when someone else plays V1 and the 
others play V1/n (d=e<n-1). This always happens. 
 
In order to have a type 1.2) equilibrium,  
a) it must not pay to deviate from playing V1 when the others play either V1/n or 





















































































                      (A26) 
 
 
b) It must also be optimal not to deviate from playing V1/n when someone else 


























    (A27) 
 
This system is always verified. 
 
c) Additionally, it must not pay to deviate from playing VIns when there is someone 























     (A28) 
This system is always verified. 
 
In order to have a type 1.3) equilibrium,  
a) it must not pay to deviate from playing V1 when everyone else plays VIns. This 
































































     (A29)  
 
 
b) It must also not pay to deviate from playing VIns when someone else plays V1 























     (A30) 
This system is always verified. 
 
In order to have a type 2.1) equilibrium, it must not pay to deviate from playing 
































































      (A31)  
 
In order to have a type 2.2) equilibrium,  













































































































         (A32) 
 
b) Additionally, it must not pay to deviate from playing VIns when no one else 
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         (A34) 
 
In order to have a type 2.3) equilibrium, 
a) it must not pay to deviate from playing V1/n when everyone else plays VIns. 
















































































       (A35) 
 
b) Additionally, it must not pay to deviate from VIns when no one is playing V1. 
d=n-1. This is the same system as (33). 

























        (A36) 
 
In order to have a type 3.1) equilibrium,  




































































      (A37) 
 
 
b) Additionally, it must not pay to deviate from playing V1/n when no sibling 
plays V1. That is, system (32) must be satisfied.  
































         (A38) 
 
In order to have a type 3.2) equilibrium,  
a) it must not pay to deviate from playing VIns when no sibling plays V1. This 
happens when system (33) is verified. 
     
 b) Additionally, it must not pay to deviate from playing V1/n when no sibling 
plays V1. That is, system (32) must be satisfied. 
 
































         (A39) 
 
In order to have a type 3.3) equilibrium, it must not pay to deviate from playing 







































































The solutions of the model with costs of effort, financial costs, disappointment 
effects, and n children 
 
We consider again the taxonomy of solutions that was presented in Appendix 2.  
  The conditions for a type 1.1) equilibrium are: 
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      (A42) 
 
It now happens that when someone else plays V1, it is not indifferent to play V1/n 
or VIns, as it was before. As the only consequence of offering to have the parent at home 
part of the time, instead of offering to pay in order to have him in an institution, is an 
increase in the parent’s utility,  VIns is dominated by V1/n. Therefore, there will be no 
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equilibrium including VIns and V1 simultaneously. That is to say the 1.2) and the 1.3) 
equilibria of section 2.3 will not be equilibria here. 
 
The conditions for a type 2.1) equilibrium are the following: 















































































     (A43) 
 
The conditions for a type 2.2) equilibrium are the following: 
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The conditions for a type 2.3) equilibrium are the following: 
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      (A49) 
 
The conditions for a type 3.1) equilibrium are the following: 
a) d = n-1 and  e = n-1 
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The conditions for a type 3.2) equilibrium are the following: 
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The conditions for a type 3.3) equilibrium are the following: 
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 It is now possible that there are equilibria including more than one V1. We have 
already stated that when V1 is played, no one plays VIns. Therefore, we will now have a 
type 4.1) equilibrium: (V1, V1, …, V1), and a type 4.2) equilibrium: (V1, V1, …, V1/n). 
The conditions under which they take place are the following: 
































       (A56) 
 These conditions resume to:   
 
)(...)( 11 Ins
ba VCbnnVC −≤ α , as long as 0)( 1 ≥VC
a .       (A57) 
  
 Type 4.2) equilibrium.  




































The two conditions resume to: 
 [ ]11 )(.).()( α+−−≤ Insba VCbdnVC , as long as 0)( 1 ≥VC a .      (A59) 
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The set of conditions resumes to: 





Payoffs in the Canonical Model with 2 Children 
 V1 V1/2 VIns 
V1 U(V1)- 0,5.C(V1);  
U(V1)- 0,5.C(V1) 




V1/2 U(V1);  
U(V1) – C(V1) 
U(V1/2) – 0,5.C(V1);  
U(V1/2) – 0,5.C(V1) 
0,5.U(V1/2) + 0,5. U(VIns) – 
0,5.C(V1);  
0,5.U(V1/2) + 0,5. U(VIns) 
VIns U(V1);  
U(V1) – C(V1) 
0,5.U(V1/2)+ 0,5. U(VIns); 






U(V1): the parent’s utility of always living with the same child. 
U(V1/2): the parent’s utility of living part of the time with each child.  
U(VIns): the parent’s utility of living in an institution. 
C(V1): the child’s cost of effort and time of coresiding with the parent all the time. 
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Table 1’ 
Payoffs in the Model with Financial Costs and 2 Children 



































U(V1/2) – 0,5. C
a




U(V1/2) – 0,5. C
a




0,5.U(V1/2) + 0,5. U(VIns) – 
0,5. C
a




















0,5.U(V1/2) + 0,5. U(VIns) – 
0,5. C
a












b is the ratio of the financial cost of keeping the parent at home over the 















Cost of effort + − indeterminate + 
Financial cost − or indeterm. − or indeter. + + 
Disappointment 
effect 













 The area identified with V1 corresponds to the solutions leading to a full time 
coresidence living arrangement. 
 The area identified with V1/2,V1/2 corresponds to the solution of equally 
divided coresidence living arrangement. 
 The area identified with VIns corresponds to the solution of full time 
institutionalization. 
 
